by Carlos Piego
IERES Occasional Papers, no. 38, November 2026 “Transnational History of the Far Right” Series
Photo: Made using “Almudena 2022 – overview” by Fernando licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0; “Mexico City Metropolitan Cathedral from southwest” by Daniel Case licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0; “Crucifix VandA 5414-1859” by Marie-Lan Nguyen licensed under CC BY 2.5; “SMBL kowadlo p” by przykuta licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0.
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©IERES 2026
Editor’s note:
Under the militantly anti-modernist Popes Pius IX, X, and XI, the Vatican had tried to resist the secularizing forces that led to Italian unification, and by 1926 had begun the negotiations that would culminate, over the following years, in a pattern of diplomatic accommodation with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany—the 1929 Lateran Pact with Benito Mussolini’s regime, and in 1933 the Reichskonkordat with the Third Reich.
In the winter of 1926, wealthy landowners and their allies, with some support from American Catholic and business interests, mobilized Catholic peasants across western Mexico to take up arms against a government determined to implement a progressive social agenda and break the Church’s hold over the semi-feudal order of public life. The ensuing Cristero War lasted three years, killed an estimated 70,000–100,000 combatants (with some estimates, including civilian deaths, as high as 250,000), and ended in a truce that satisfied none of its parties.1 History has largely filed it away as a regional upheaval at the edge of the Mexican Revolution, but the political and religious conflict behind it was never resolved. Disarmed but unreconciled, the militant Catholic camp in Mexico endured, bound by elite networks of money, kinship, and conviction. Out of it grew two organizations that would, within a century, reach further than the Cristeros ever had—and do so almost entirely unseen.
The two papers that follow examine that afterlife, and with it develop an aspect of the study of the far right which has largely been overlooked: religious fundamentalism, here in its militant Catholic form.
One paper examines El Yunque (the Anvil, whose insignia bears a striking resemblance to that of the Nazi flag), a secretive Mexican sect founded in Puebla in the mid-1950s; the other, the Legionaries of Christ, a Vatican-recognized religious congregation founded in 1941 by a priest whose uncles had commanded Cristero armies. Both were born of the same crucible, the Cristero War, and inherited the same political creed—traditionalist social hierarchies, Hispanidad, militant anti-Communism, and the defense of Western civilization against its enemies.
Where both diverge is in their methods. El Yunque chose the street and the campus. It took root in Mexican universities such as the Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla (UPAEP),2 then carried its model to Spain through two front organizations: HazteOír, a mass-mobilization and petition platform; and its international offshoot CitizenGO—both presenting themselves as ordinary civic campaigns while steering supporters toward an undisclosed agenda.3 HazteOír helped drive the mobilizations behind the rise of Vox, Spain’s far-right party, whose early leaders Iván Espinosa de los Monteros and Rocío Monasterio, according to the historian Santiago Mata, had close ties to El Yunque.4 CitizenGO extended the network abroad, its board coming to include, until 2022, figures such as Alexey Komov, often described as the right-hand man of the sanctioned Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev.5
The Legionaries chose another path: the classroom and the Curia. Marcial Maciel Degollado built an elite network of schools and universities, from the Cumbres and Anáhuac institutions to the Mano Amiga schools across Latin America, that trained generations of the region’s business and political class. In the 1950s, he established Regnum Christi, a wider movement of lay Catholics and consecrated members built around the Legionaries, with the congregation serving as its priestly and religious branch. Together they extended Maciel’s influence far beyond the congregation itself—while cardinals who prized him as a bulwark against Communism shielded him, for decades, from credible accusations of serial sexual abuse that the Vatican would acknowledge only after his death.6
The two organizations’ presence within Catholic institutional life had, by 2025, grown intertwined—not through sudden convergence, but through years of accumulated positions in the same networks. A senior Regnum Christi figure sat on the board of the International Academy of Catholic Leaders (IACL), alongside Rodrigo Guerra López, whose own ties to El Yunque circles came under scrutiny in March 2025, when the Academy’s founder, himself a former El Yunque member, publicly questioned whether those ties had been disclosed and later resigned.7 The episode, along with reporting of a broader El Yunque effort to place allies in positions overseeing Catholic higher education in Latin America and worldwide, offered a glimpse of how deeply these networks had penetrated the institutions of Catholic education.
Read together, the papers reconstruct how two organizations born of the same civil war became, through patience, money, and a rare gift for institutional camouflage, durable and largely unaccountable powers: they shape universities across Mexico, work through far-right parties such as Vox, and occupy positions within the Roman Curia. And both serve as proof of concept that Catholic fundamentalism—being neither apolitical nor confined to the pews—remains among the most consequential and least examined forces feeding the far right, in Mexico, in Europe, and within the Church itself.
Introduction
After decades of international activity, the ultraconservative Mexican sect El Yunque (the Anvil) remains one of the main forces operating in the shadows of the far right across much of the Spanish-speaking and Christian world. Founded in 1955 in the city of Puebla (Mexico),8 El Yunque traces its roots to reactionary Catholic movements that shaped twentieth-century Mexican history, most notably the Cristeros—insurgents in the Cristero War (1926–1929), whose name derives from “Cristo Rey” (Christ the King)—and the Tecos, a right-wing Catholic student group based at the Autonomous University of Guadalajara, whose name may originate either from the acronym Tarea Educativa y Cultural hacia el Orden y la Síntesis (educational and cultural work toward order and synthesis), or from tecolote, a colloquial Mexican term for “owl.”9 Originally created to counter secularism in higher education and, more broadly, in Mexican society, El Yunque soon consolidated its presence in academic institutions before seeking to expand its influence throughout Latin America and Europe. Years of political activity in Spain, the group’s principal target, allowed El Yunque to become an uncomfortable yet influential force within key organizations of Spanish Catholicism, as well as in right-wing and far-right parties, most notably the People’s Party (Partido Popular, PP) and, years later, Vox.
With financial backing from the Rumasa group—a major Spanish holding company founded by José María Ruiz-Mateos (1931–2015) which was expropriated by the Spanish government in 1983—and from the Larramendi family—a prominent Spanish entrepreneurial family associated with the insurance group MAPFRE—El Yunque decided to create a front organization to intervene publicly in Spanish political life: HazteOír (make your voice heard). This alter ego of El Yunque took shape during the summer courses of the Phoenix Institute in the United States, a charismatic organization led by Dr. John Xavier Evans. El Yunque soon became an important actor in Spanish politics, organizing events and participating in demonstrations against the government of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE, 2004–2011). After several scandals revealed the mistreatment of activists by members of El Yunque who led the organization, the group attempted to deflect attention, creating the international offshoot, CitizenGO, and siding with the far-right party Vox.
In a context marked by strong US interventionism in Latin America and Europe, particularly since the publication of the National Security Strategy by the second administration of President Donald Trump, El Yunque has maintained a presence at senior levels internationally. On the one hand, the president of Vox, Santiago Abascal, who received an award from HazteOír in 2012 and has maintained close ties with the organization since then, was appointed in 2024 as chairman of the newly formed far-right European party Patriots.eu.10 On the other hand, CitizenGO is a member of the World Congress of Families (WCF), the international organization promoting ultraconservative Christian values worldwide.

As a supporter of Vox, the leader of the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) party and current Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has attended several Vox party rallies in Spain, where she has promoted the traditional family and Europe’s Christian identity. Source: Clarida Salvatori and Laura Martellini, “Giorgia Meloni, dal Fronte della Gioventù al trionfo alle elezioni: Le tappe della carriera,” Corriere della Sera, September 28, 2022, https://roma.corriere.it/cronaca/cards/giorgia-meloni-fronte-gioventu-trionfo-elezioni-tappe-carriera/comizio-spagna-palco-vox.shtml.
The Long History of the Mexican Reactionary Agents
Organizations such as Los Tecos or El Yunque are fundamentally embodiments of the forces that, throughout history, have sought to dominate the Mexican people and control their resources. From the defeat of the Mexica Empire by the Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés in 1519 to 1521, and the founding of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, the Indigenous peoples of what is now Mexico endured violence and forced labor imposed by the Spanish Crown for decades, leading to a severe demographic decline. For its part, the Catholic Church became firmly established in the Spanish colony in order to secure ideological domination over subordinate populations, allowing the institution to accumulate enormous power. By the time of the cry for Mexican independence following Napoleon’s occupation of the Iberian Peninsula, a conservative elite had already begun to reject the independence process, looking nostalgically toward the monarchical past of the new republic, following the collapse of the independent Mexican Empire of 1821–1823.
However, the Mexican independence process of the early nineteenth century did not put an end to the structural problems inherited from Spanish imperialism. The distribution of land, the plundering of resources, and the discrimination against Indigenous populations remained part of the reality oppressing the Mexican people. Mexican haciendas, lands exploitable through agriculture or mining that were the heir to the Spanish encomiendas,11 condemned the rural population to marginalization from the benefits of the land. Mexico’s reactionary classes even conspired with foreign powers to install sympathetic figures in power and restore the order that had existed prior to the liberal Constitution of 1857, circumstances that prompted the invasion by forces under Napoleon III during the Second French Intervention in Mexico (1861–1867). It was only after the revolutionary outbreak of 1910, led by figures such as Emiliano Zapata (1879–1919) and Pancho Villa (1878–1923), and after ten years of intense civil war, that a new revolutionary elite took power. Its heirs founded the National Revolutionary Party (Partido Nacional Revolucionario, PNR) in 1929, the forerunner of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), which would govern Mexico until 2000. The 1917 Mexican Constitution established state sovereignty over natural resources and imposed limits on the social, political, and economic influence of the Church.
Nevertheless, reactionary forces were not completely defeated, paving the way, only a few years later, for the Cristero War (1926–1929). The conflict was waged primarily by the Cristeros, a paramilitary grassroots movement of Roman Catholic, largely illiterate rural populations, who adopted the militant, theocratic worldview of Mexican conservatism and took up arms.12 The movement was based primarily in the center-west region of Mexico. Peace returned only after a 1929 settlement between the government and the bishops eased the antagonism between the Church and the secular, post-revolutionary Mexican state.
Another key link to the Cristero movement and Mexico’s conservative Catholic elite is found in the Legionaries of Christ (Legionarios de Cristo), founded by Marcial Maciel Degollado.13 During the Cristero War, members of Maciel’s maternal family played a prominent role in the leadership of the Cristero armies. In particular, his maternal uncle, Jesús Degollado Guízar, along with his cousins José Guízar and Luis Morfín Guízar, all served as generals in the insurgent forces. These family ties extended further into the upper ranks of the Cristero leadership. Jesús Degollado Guízar was married to Soledad Bouquet, whose brother, Carlos Bouquet Carranza, also held the rank of general before being executed by the Mexican Army in 1929. Even as early as 1914, Maciel’s maternal great-uncle, Bishop Rafael Guízar y Valencia, was involved in the clandestine Union of Mexican Catholics (Unión de Católicos Mexicanos, UCM), an organization that would later play a central role in orchestrating the Cristero uprising in 1926.
From Tecos to El Yunque: Origins of a Mexican Catholic Militant Network
The origins of El Yunque are closely tied to the political and religious struggles of early twentieth-century Mexico, particularly those centered on education, Catholic resistance, and anti-Communist mobilization. Its roots can be traced back to the formation of Los Tecos, a political and religious organization created in 1934 by young Catholic university students in Guadalajara, under the guidance of the Jesuit Order.14 An integralist15 and national-Catholic secret organization, Los Tecos emerged in opposition to the socialist education project launched by the post-revolutionary Mexican state, which they perceived as a direct threat to Catholic values and national identity. When they failed to stop the institutionalization of socialist education in the main university of Jalisco, they concentrated their efforts on founding a new Catholic-oriented institution: the Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara (UAG), which was established in 1935. This marked the Jesuits’ first significant intervention in Mexican higher education and reflected their determination to build an ideological stronghold against secularism and state control.
Los Tecos openly identified themselves as heirs to the Cristero political tradition, the paramilitary movement composed of Catholic peasants who fought against the secular and post-Revolutionary Mexican state (1926–1929),16 and embraced a militant, theocratic worldview. They considered themselves defenders of the faith against what they called the “Judeo-Masonic-Communist conspiracy.” Originally operating under the name Asociación Fraternal de Estudiantes de Jalisco (Fraternal Student Association of Jalisco, Afej), the group adopted secretive, almost paramilitary organizational methods and quickly became a node within the international anti-Communist movement. Although the Jesuits later distanced themselves from the UAG, founding the Western Institute of High Technology Studies (Instituto Tecnológico de Estudios Superiores de Occidente, ITESO) in 1958 with the support of conservative business elites and Archbishop José Garibi Rivera, the ideological influence of Los Tecos continued to resonate, particularly among a new generation of militants.17
Under the protective umbrella of US President Lyndon B. Johnson’s anti-Communist policies, Los Tecos founded the Mexican Anti-Communist Federation of the West (Federación Mexicana Anticomunista de Occidente, FEMACO) in 1967. Based in Guadalajara, FEMACO organized the sixth assembly of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) in Mexico City, founded in 1966, that united anti-Communist groups, politicians, and militias from around the world to promote conservative, often authoritarian and ultra-nationalist agendas.18 The Tecos joined the WACL through FEMACO, which served as their platform for denouncing Latin American bishops who supported the reforms of the Second Vatican Council, as well as members of the Catholic Church who expressed sympathy for armed struggle as a means of addressing injustice and inequality in the region.19
One key figure closely associated with Los Tecos was Jesuit priest Manuel Figueroa Luna, widely seen as a mentor to Ramón Plata Moreno, the eventual founder of El Yunque.20 Plata Moreno, born in 1935 into a middle-class Catholic family, enrolled in the Civil Engineering Department of the Meritorious Autonomous University of Puebla (Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla) in 1952. It was there, encouraged by priests aligned with the Tecos’ ideology, that he established El Yunque, a secret militant organization that aimed to defend the Church against Communism, Freemasonry, and other perceived enemies. Plata Moreno envisioned El Yunque as a combat body committed to establishing the kingdom of God in the hearts of individuals and in the Mexican nation.
Inspired by the militant example of Los Tecos and the institutional model of the UAG, Plata Moreno launched El Yunque in Puebla in 1955 and later attempted to expand its reach to Mexico City, throughout Latin America, and to Spain. Within this framework, El Yunque emerged as an extreme-right organization rooted in Cristero and Hispanist ideology, a cultural-political vision that emphasizes the shared identity, heritage, and mission of the Spanish-speaking world, rooted in Spain’s imperial and Catholic past. It sought first to take control of the universities, then to dominate civil society, and eventually to influence or seize political power. Plata Moreno, often portrayed as a spiritual warrior or martyr of Christ the King, was seen by his followers as a quasi-messianic figure surrounded by twelve apostles, a core group committed to an expansive vision of ideological and cultural reconquest.
The name El Yunque itself, meaning “the Anvil,” comes from a phrase attributed to Saint Ignatius of Antioch, spoken as he was led to martyrdom: “Stand firm in adversity, like an anvil under the hammer.”21 This invocation of steadfastness in suffering encapsulates the group’s ethos: disciplined, secretive, militant, and convinced of its divine mission to reshape the nation and the Western Hemisphere in the image of God and Church.
Plata Moreno’s project was understood as part of a broader “crusade for Hispanidad,” rooted in a vision of restoring Catholic hegemony across the Hispanic world. His ideological lineage placed him in continuity with figures like Pelayo, El Cid, and the Catholic Monarchs, all icons of Spanish national-Catholic militancy and Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from Muslim rule in the Middle Ages.22 This crusading spirit also drew symbolic inspiration from Hernán Cortés, recast by El Yunque as a religious emissary, with his conquest interpreted as a legitimate and even necessary vehicle for the imposition of the Catholic faith. In this sense, El Yunque was not just a reactionary movement: it was a theological-political project of reconquest, seeking to re-Christianize society under the banner of militant Catholicism.
Before weaving its international network through front organizations, El Yunque had already sought to intervene in public life through various university offshoots: the Anti-Communist University Front (Frente Universitario Anticomunista, FUA), the University Movement for a Renewed Orientation (Movimiento Universitario de Renovadora Orientación, MURO, whose acronym spells out the Spanish word for a defensive wall) and the Puebla State Autonomous People’s University (Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla, UPAEP). Founded in the city of Puebla, the FUA was led by Plata Moreno, and was influenced by the Jesuit Order.23 Established in the context of the Cold War and the Cuban Revolution (1953–1958), the FUA emerged with the aim of combating the perceived threat of Communist infiltration in Mexico. MURO operated under the same principles as the FUA, though its activities were based in Mexico City rather than Puebla. Regarding UPAEP, which was founded in 1973 by El Yunque militants, today it is still controlled by a high-ranking member of the sect, Emilio Baños Ardavín.24
The Situation of the Far Right on the Other Side of the Atlantic
Shortly before the creation of the Tecos in 1934—established to continue the mission initiated by the Cristeros during their conflict with the post-revolutionary Mexican state (1926–1929)—the situation in Europe was broadly favorable to this type of reactionary movement. In 1929, the Lateran Treaty definitively reconciled the Vatican with the Italian government, with which it had been in dispute since the Risorgimento and which was then under Benito Mussolini’s Fascist control. Likewise, in 1933, the concordat between the Holy See and Nazi Germany, known as the Reichskonkordat, was negotiated on behalf of the German government by Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, and signed on terms similar to those negotiated with Fascist Italy. With the political winds at its back, ultraconservative and militant Catholicism was consolidating itself on a global scale.

Comparison between the red version of the El Yunque flag (left) and the Nazi party flag (right). El Yunque flag redrawn from Jesús Bastante, “La ‘reaparición’ del Yunque y el silencio cómplice de los obispos españoles,” Religión Digital, February 21, 2023, https://www.religiondigital.org/el_baron_rampante/Yunque-mirada-lado-obispos-olona-evole-hazteoir-luengos-paves-arguello-rouco_7_2535116473.html.
Following the end of the Second World War, the confrontation between the Communist and materialist bloc and a capitalist bloc positioning itself as the defender of Western values once again created favorable conditions for transnational reactionary Catholicism. By the mid-1950s, the European Social Movement (ESM) was fully active, bringing together prominent neo-fascist leaders such as British MP Sir Oswald Mosley (1896–1980) and French writer Maurice Bardèche (1907–1988). In Spain, a country that would become central to the expansion of El Yunque, the very year of the sect’s founding (1955) coincided with Generalísimo Francisco Franco’s dictatorship joining the United Nations, thereby securing significant international recognition.
El Yunque’s Religious and Political Network: Connections in Spain and Latin America
The transnational development and consolidation of El Yunque relied on a complex network of religious, political, and financial actors. Central to its expansion into Spain was the role played by Miguel Ángel López Zavaleta, a Mexican political operator from Puebla and first leader of El Yunque in Spain, and Spanish priest Rafael Hernando de Larramendi Samaniego. The organization also benefited from the strategic financial support from the Rumasa conglomerate, then controlled by José María Ruiz Mateos, with strong ties to Opus Dei, a Catholic institution with important networks of influence in business, education, and politics. In Latin America, the connection goes through Carlos Alberto Sacheri, an editorial board member of the Catholic integralist magazine Verbo.
Eduardo García Suárez, an early and trusted member of El Yunque, was tasked with missions in Europe as early as 1963.25 That year, he was sent to Spain by Plata Moreno, to establish ties with like-minded traditionalist Catholic groups. García Suárez recalls being dispatched to meet Jean Ousset, founder of Cité Catholique, together with members of its Spanish offshoot, Ciudad Católica, a far-right Catholic group that promoted integralist ideas and influenced conservative and anti-Communist networks in Europe and Latin America. He later made contact with cadres of Francisco Franco’s regime upon arriving in Spain.
The group’s most influential figure in Spain, however, was Miguel Ángel López Zavaleta. Officially recognized as the head of El Yunque in Spain, López Zavaleta played a leading role in developing the organization’s infrastructure and recruitment strategies. He also coordinated with the platform HazteOír, a front organization used by El Yunque to disseminate its ideology and attract sympathizers. López Zavaleta was instrumental in forging a lasting partnership with the Ruiz Mateos family and their Rumasa business empire.26 This collaboration began in the early 1970s, during the last years of the Franco regime, and enabled the construction of the seminary of Nuestra Señora de la Oliva in Toledo, an important site for the spiritual formation of the group Crusaders of Christ the King (Cruzados de Cristo Rey).
A religious confraternity founded in Mexico under the guidance of Plata Moreno, the Cruzados functioned as the spiritual wing of El Yunque.27 Their presence in Spain was crucial in embedding the organization within the local religious and educational landscape. Even if Ruiz Mateos provided financial backing to Opus Dei, the Cruzados de Cristo Rey also benefited from his funding. In Spain, the Cruzados de Cristo Rey established the Fundación Nuevo Entorno (meaning “New Surroundings Foundation”), registered in Madrid in 2002.28 This foundation operated under the guise of promoting Christian humanist education but served as an institutional entry point for El Yunque’s ideological and organizational expansion. Its board was presided over by Rafael Hernando de Larramendi Samaniego and functioned as a legal and logistical cover for recruiting activists and organizing educational activities aligned with El Yunque’s conservative agenda.
The Larramendi Family
A Spanish priest belonging to El Yunque, Rafael Hernando de Larramendi y Samaniego is also a prominent operative of the Mexican religious group Siervos de Jesús (Servants of Jesus). He belongs to the Larramendi family, one of the most enduring dynasties of the Spanish traditionalist right. Their influence extends from the battlefields of the Spanish Civil War to the boardrooms of international corporations and the intellectual networks promoting Carlist29 and ultraconservative Catholic ideologies in Spain.
Rafael Hernando de Larramendi y Samaniego is the nephew of Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano (1921–2001), the latter being at the center of the present-day Larramendi family.30 A staunch Carlist, Ignacio’s ideological trajectory was shaped during his early years. He is the son of Luis Hernando de Larramendi, a traditionalist lawyer and writer. During the Spanish Civil War, Ignacio, at that time a student, joined the Requeté Auxiliar, the paramilitary wing of the Carlist movement, actively supporting the nationalist uprising against the leftist government of the Spanish Second Republic.31 Ignacio is best known for his role in transforming the family business, Mutualidad de la Agrupación de Propietarios de Fincas Rústicas de España (MAPFRE), into a global insurance giant.
Yet his legacy extends far beyond finance. Deeply committed to promoting a conservative vision of Spanish identity rooted in Catholicism and imperial nostalgia, he established the Ignacio Larramendi Foundation, which sponsors research on Hispanidad, Carlism, and traditionalist thought.
El Yunque in Latin America
Another notable ideological and institutional link is found in the Verbo, a magazine and network that at that time had extensive connections with Ciudad Católica and El Yunque. Key figures such as Carlos Alberto Sacheri, a disciple of far-right ideologist and anti-Semite Father Julio Meinvielle and a known member of the right-wing Triple A death squad in Argentina, helped to solidify trans-Atlantic connections. Sacheri, a close associate of Plata Moreno, was pivotal in disseminating Catholic traditionalist ideas and connecting Argentinean and Spanish networks, including Verbo’s Spanish contributors like Miguel Ayuso, Rafael Gambra, and Francisco Elías de Tejada, the latter considered “one of the most important representatives of traditionalist political thought of the Franco period.”32 These figures, with deep roots in Francoist ideology, formed part of the broader cultural and ideological framework within which El Yunque operated, mainly through the presence of Federico Müggenburg, a former leader of El Yunque, with ties to the Mexican business elite, specifically through the prestigious Monterrey Group, a network of powerful business families and industrial firms based in Monterrey.
HazteOír and El Yunque: Origins, Networks, and Ideological Foundations
Rather than presenting itself openly, El Yunque operates through a constellation of front associations and civic platforms. These entities serve as vehicles for influencing public life while concealing the identity of the organization’s members and strategic objectives. A recurrent method employed both in Mexico and Spain involves the multiplication of apparently independent associations, each tailored to mobilize citizens around specific moral, social, or political causes. When an initiative fails, it is abandoned; when it succeeds, non-member volunteers are gradually given visible roles to legitimize the organization’s presence, though real decision-making remains under the control of El Yunque’s inner circle. This model allows the movement to maintain plausible deniability and flexibility while preserving ideological consistency.
In Spain, several of these platforms have achieved significant visibility, with HazteOír becoming the most notable of this strategy. HazteOír became prominent during the 2000s through mass mobilizations against the legalization of same-sex marriage, the introduction in public education of the subject “Education for Citizenship,” and the reform of abortion law. While many volunteers involved were not Yunque members, associations like HazteOír have channeled their activism toward the organization’s underlying political and religious agenda. El Yunque’s internal discipline reinforces this structure. Members reportedly take an oath of secrecy and obedience to the organization above personal or professional considerations. Former participants in HazteOír have described disproportionate treatment and exclusion once they began questioning internal directives or withdrew their collaboration.
Founding and Development of HazteOír
HazteOír was officially founded in February 2001 by Ignacio Arsuaga Rato, a lawyer from Madrid and distant relative of former Spanish Finance Minister Rodrigo Rato. Although it has not been conclusively demonstrated that Ignacio Arsuaga is an official member of El Yunque—a claim he denies33—critics argue that the organization is led by individuals who are connected to the sect. The association was conceived as a pro-life and pro-family civic lobby promoting conservative Catholic values through online mobilization, petitions, and public demonstrations. According to several testimonies and journalistic investigations, the genesis of HazteOír can be traced back to an Internet forum created around 1996, when Arsuaga, then on a sabbatical year after early professional difficulties, started a digital discussion space for Catholic-minded citizens.34 This initiative was later institutionalized as an association with legal status in 2001, reportedly under the guidance of figures connected to El Yunque’s Spanish network, notably Luis Losada Pescador, who had previously recruited Arsuaga into the sect.
The group’s formative circle overlapped with students and alumni from private Catholic universities, including the University of Navarra, the CEU San Pablo Foundation, and the University Francisco de Vitoria, institutions known for ties to conservative Catholic movements such as Opus Dei and the Legionaries of Christ.35 Several family links between early activists further reinforced the dense network connecting these milieus.
From the Phoenix Institute to HazteOír
In interviews from the early 2000s, Arsuaga described the intellectual inspiration for HazteOír as stemming from the Phoenix Institute, an organization founded in 1988 in Texas.36 It was founded by Dr. John Evans, an English professor at Arizona State University and a coordinator within the City of the Lord Catholic Charismatic Community (Arizona). The Phoenix Institute has promoted the defense of Western culture and Christian humanism, combining elements of US neoconservatism and Catholic integralism. Arsuaga attended its summer seminars in the United States and later claimed that several founders of HazteOír met during those courses.37 Following the establishment of a Spanish branch, the leadership of Phoenix Institute Spain was entrusted to El Yunque member Luis Losada Pescador, then director of content at intereconomia.com and deputy editor of the business newspaper La Gaceta de los Negocios and the Catholic weekly Alba (Dawn).
According to statements by Losada’s wife, Victoria Uroz, leaked by WikiLeaks,38 HazteOír eventually grew out of the Phoenix Institute Spain, whereby its membership fees were initially charged by the latter. However, HazteOír soon became an independent entity, and the leadership changed from Losada to Arsuaga. But American support did not end there: Uroz furthermore stated that El Yunque was receiving startup funds from the G. K. Chesterton Institute for Faith and Culture—a small, ideologically-driven center housed at Seton Hall University, which promotes a traditionalist Catholic reading of the British Catholic apologist G. K. Chesterton and uses his work as a lens for critiquing modern secular culture.
This transnational linkage between Spanish and Mexican conservative circles, mediated by the Phoenix Institute, became a key vector in the internationalization of El Yunque’s religious conservatism. It also explains the structural resemblance between HazteOír and Mexican online initiatives such as Yo Influyo (I Influence),39 founded in 2003 by the Mexican Yunque leader Guillermo Velasco. The case of HazteOír illustrates how religious fundamentalist networks can achieve sustained public influence through hybrid civic and digital forums while concealing their hierarchical and sectarian origins. Likewise, the HazteOír-El Yunque nexus represents a fusion of Spanish Catholic traditionalism with North American neoconservative activism. Their discourse emphasizes the defense of Western civilization, Christian identity, and family values against perceived threats from secularism, feminism, and global institutions. The use of digital mobilization, mass petitions, and transnational coordination anticipated the strategies of contemporary far-right and ultraconservative networks across Europe.
According to statements cited by Santiago Mata, El Yunque is portrayed as a Trojan horse through which the United States seeks to exert control over Spanish society.40 Mata’s investigation identifies the Phoenix Institute as a model of an American-style lobbying organization that would later inspire the creation of HazteOír.41 In this reading, the institute does not function solely as a lobbying body, but also as a hub for the dissemination of reactionary thought, primarily through its summer seminars held in both the United States and Europe. Ultimately, both Losada and Arsuaga are depicted by Mata as figures closely aligned with American neoconservatism, an ideological current whose primary motivations are framed as economic and political success.
First Steps: Political Influence and Ideological Framework
HazteOír gained national prominence during the Socialist government of Zapatero, when the organization orchestrated massive street protests against progressive reforms in gender, family, and education. The association’s campaigns, particularly through the affiliate platform Derecho a Vivir (Right to Life),42 focused on opposing abortion rights and same-sex marriage. Critics noted that, unlike other Catholic pro-life groups such as Red Madre (Mother Network),43 HazteOír prioritized political pressure over social assistance to women, aligning with El Yunque’s ideological emphasis on activist confrontation rather than pastoral outreach.
In May 2013, the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, then under Jorge Fernández Díaz of the conservative People’s Party, declared HazteOír a public-utility organization, granting it tax privileges and institutional recognition. However, the following years saw increasing scrutiny from journalists and researchers revealing its alleged links to El Yunque. These revelations, combined with internal controversies and the rise of its international offshoot CitizenGO, marked the beginning of HazteOír’s decline as an autonomous actor. While HazteOír continues to operate formally as an association, much of its international advocacy now flows through CitizenGO, created in 2013 as a foundation to export the same model of ultraconservative activism.
HazteOír’s Exposure and the Birth of CitizenGO
Although its early objective was to defend Prime Minister José María Aznar’s People’s Party government (1996–2004) in the face of widespread social protests, HazteOír reached the height of its influence following Zapatero’s electoral victory in 2004.44 During this period, HazteOír enjoyed protection from influential figures within the Catholic Church, including Cardinal Antonio María Rouco Varela. Nevertheless, Arsuaga’s insistence on controlling both the strategy and finances of the wider ultraconservative movement caused a rupture with the Foro de la Familia (Family Forum), another key pro-family group. As its confrontational style escalated, HazteOír gradually lost the official support of the Catholic hierarchy and the People’s Party.45
In 2014, Madrid’s Court of First Instance No. 48 heard a civil case brought by HazteOír against philosopher Fernando López Luengos concerning a report he had prepared in 2010 at the request of the auxiliary bishop of Getafe.46 The report detailed alleged links between the clandestine organization El Yunque and ultra-Catholic groups such as HazteOír. After the report became public, HazteOír filed suit claiming it had been unlawfully harmed; however, the court dismissed the claims and ordered the organization to cover the costs of the proceedings. The report itself described patterns of “control, infiltration, and concealment” attributed to El Yunque in Spain, alleging its infiltration of media outlets, political parties such as the People’s Party, universities, church movements, and diocesan structures.47
The trial also revealed the identities of several of the key members of El Yunque in Spain. An article on the Spanish news site El Confidencial lists the following membership ties:
Eduardo Hertzfelder, president of the Instituto de Política Familiar; Jaime Urcelay, of Profesionales por la Ética; Liberto Senderos, of the Organización del Bien Común; Leonor Tamayo, of the Grupo de Montaña Contracorriente; the members of HazteOír Álvaro Zulueta, his wife Olga Cuquerella (sister of the former personal secretary of Iñaki Urdangarin, Julia Cuquerella), their brother Marcial Cuquerella, and Luis Losada, deputy editor of the newspaper La Gaceta of the Grupo Intereconomía, and current collaborator of 13 TV, a television channel run by bishops.48
Of particular interest is Álvaro Zulueta, a key link between El Yunque, HazteOír, CitizenGO, and the Cruzados de Cristo Rey. Born in Madrid into a noble family, Zulueta was a founding board member of HazteOír from 2001 to 2013, where he served in senior roles including project coordinator, treasurer, and head of international relations.49 He later became CEO of CitizenGO from 2013 to 2017, leading its international expansion and alliances with conservative advocacy groups. Furthermore, according to journalist Álvaro Delgado and other investigative sources, Zulueta is identified as a senior member of El Yunque in Spain.50
Zulueta is married to Olga Cuquerella Gamboa, who has been the subject of controversy due to her alleged involvement in the Nóos corruption scandal. The Nóos case centered on the nonprofit Instituto Nóos, run by Iñaki Urdangarin, King Emeritus Juan Carlos I’s son-in-law, which was used to divert millions of euros in public funds through inflated contracts for sporting events. Cuquerella was identified by investigators as one of several “phantom employees” who were part of the scheme. While she was not ultimately convicted, the scandal led to Urdangarin’s going to prison and severely damaged the Spanish monarchy’s public standing.51
El Yunque’s proven existence before the courts was preceded by several years of media scrutiny.52 Former members publicly denounced the sect, exposing its abusive practices of indoctrination and violence. In order to deflect attention from HazteOír, Arsuaga and other El Yunque affiliates launched CitizenGO, an international petition platform. Among its board members was Alexey Komov of the Russian branch of the World Congress of Families, who has been described as an intermediary between Russian media oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, sanctioned for his close ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the American religious right. HazteOír played a central role in hosting the World Congress of Families in Madrid in 2012 and continued to act as a partner organization in subsequent editions. Over time, it became one of the very few European organizations formally recognized as an official supporter of the initiative. During the Sydney congress in 2013, Arsuaga received the inaugural Natural Family Man and Woman of the Year Award and later served as an honorary keynote speaker at the WCF meeting held in Salt Lake City in 2015.53
From the Shadows of Hispanidad to Parliament: How El Yunque Helped Shape Vox
The relationship between Vox and the secretive ultra-Catholic organization El Yunque developed gradually through the personal and political trajectory of Santiago Abascal. By 2011, as president of the Fundación DENAES (Defensa de la Nación Española: defense of the Spanish nation), an organization dedicated to spreading Spanish nationalism and the ideology of Hispanidad, Abascal had already begun to surround himself with figures connected to HazteOír, El Yunque’s main platform in Spain. This relationship was forged not only through El Yunque’s political affinity with DENAES, both upholding a Hispanic ideology of reconquest, but also through their shared move to distance themselves from the People’s Party, whose stances on key issues like abortion, gay marriage, or regional separatism they deemed insufficiently conservative. That year, at the foundation’s summer school, a sworn member of El Yunque, Juan de Dios Dávila, appeared publicly alongside Abascal under the cover of a civic association called Unidad + Diversidad. In 2012, Luis Losada, another Yunque member and then director of Intereconomía’s nightly news program, joined Abascal at a DENAES event. Their ties became closer when HazteOír awarded Abascal one of its annual prizes,54 introducing him as president of DENAES but omitting his membership in the People’s Party. The laudatory introduction of Abascal by Losada underscored the ideological affinity and political investment of El Yunque in his rise:
Our next awardee is the president of DENAES, Santi Abascal. He is fond of recalling that solemn phrase from Apuleius: one by one, we are all immortal, but together, we are eternal. The unity of Spain is Santi’s banner. His goal: that one day it will no longer need to be defended. Although I very much fear, Santi, that you will have to carry on the struggle for a few more years. Centripetal forces [sic] threaten to destroy the world’s first nation, the discoverer and evangelizer of America, the founder of International Law, and above all, the cradle of law and democracy.55
The Fundación DENAES (for the Defense of the Spanish Nation)
The Fundación DENAES functioned as the laboratory in which Vox was conceived and its methods rehearsed. It was within DENAES that strategies, rituals, and even the practice of closing rallies with the national anthem were established. Created at the initiative of businessman Ricardo Garrudo, with Abascal at its head, the foundation received endorsement from former Prime Minister José María Aznar before being launched.56 Over time, DENAES attracted a wide range of intellectuals and political figures, including known figures linked to the Spanish New Right, like José Javier Esparza and Alejo Vidal-Quadras,57 philosopher Gustavo Bueno (whose son served as secretary of the foundation and coauthored a book with Abascal), sociologist Amando de Miguel, historian Fernando García de Cortázar, Francisco Caja of Convivencia Cívica Catalana (Catalan civic coexistence), and politicians such as Gabriel Cisneros. Even former Socialist leaders Joaquín Leguina and Nicolás Redondo Terreros were invited to its summer school as lecturers. Ultimately, DENAES provided the party’s organizational framework and activist base, with Vidal-Quadras, Vox’s first president, joining its honorary board as early as 2006.58
El Yunque and Vox’s Foundation
These networks became even clearer in the months leading up to the creation of Vox. Abascal strengthened his ties with Iván Espinosa de los Monteros and Rocío Monasterio, a married couple whom the historian Santiago Mata describes as having had a close relationship with El Yunque.59 At a DENAES event in December 2012, Espinosa appeared as vice president of the foundation, seated alongside Abascal, the sociologist Amando de Miguel, and President of HazteOír Ignacio Arsuaga. When Vox was officially launched in January 2014, HazteOír provided the infrastructure to broadcast the presentation online, effectively placing its resources at the service of Abascal’s new party. HazteOír also facilitated international contacts, including a trip by Abascal to Iraq and the creation of StopIsis, a platform that brought together DENAES with other Yunque fronts such as Enraizados (Rooted) and Abogados Cristianos (Christian Attorneys). Donations for the fledgling party were channeled through HazteOír, revealing the extent of institutional overlap.60

Through HazteOír, El Yunque played an active role in the founding of Vox. The image shows Santiago Abascal alongside Ignacio Arsuaga in 2012, at the moment when the future leader of Vox received an award from the association. Source: Javier Escartín, “‘El que me ama, obedecerá mi palabra’: Los perfiles ultracatólicos que anidan en Vox,” Huffington Post, August 13, 2023, https://www.huffingtonpost.es/politica/el-me-ama-obedecera-mi-palabra-perfiles-ultracatolicos-anidan-vox.html.
This collaboration extended into the international sphere. In 2019, openDemocracy, a non-profit global media outlet founded in 2001 that publishes investigative journalism and analysis on democracy, documented how El Yunque supported Vox via CitizenGO, HazteOír’s international spin-off, linking the Spanish party to a transnational network of far-right organizations and to groups aligned with Donald Trump in the United States.61 The relationship continued to bear political fruit. Following Vox’s performance in the November 2019 general election, in which it became the third-largest party in the Congress of Deputies with 52 seats and around 15% of the vote, as well as its gains in regional contests, it became public that several elected officials had pre-existing direct or indirect ties to El Yunque.62 Among them were Gádor Joya, a Madrid deputy and founder of HazteOír’s Derecho a Vivir campaign; Francisco José Contreras, deputy for Sevilla and considered one of El Yunque’s main ideological advisors;63 Cristina Peláez, a former member of HazteOír; Lourdes Méndez Monasterio, linked to both Arsuaga and Rocío Monasterio in the Plataforma por las Libertades (Platform for Liberties); and Juan José Liarte, regional deputy in Murcia and trustee of Abogados Cristianos. Together, these figures exemplify how El Yunque’s networks penetrated Vox’s structures, enabling the party to consolidate itself as Spain’s foremost far-right political force.64
The infiltration of El Yunque into Vox has not been limited to the party at the Spanish national level alone, but also extends to the party’s structures at the supranational level. Vox’s presence in the European Parliament, first within the European Conservatives and Reformists parliamentary group and later in the Patriots for Europe, opens the door for El Yunque to access key European Union institutions. This means that, apart from its CitizenGO international output, El Yunque has gained access to the largest international of far-right political parties in Europe. Likewise, youth organizations linked to Vox, such as Revuelta (Revolt), are also controlled by individuals belonging to El Yunque, namely Revuelta’s leader, Jaime Hernández.

Led since November 2024 by Santiago Abascal, Patriots.eu, a far-right European political party, includes former member parties of the European Conservatives and Reformists (such as Spain’s Vox), the Identity and Democracy group (such as France’s National Rally, or Rassemblement National, RN), and former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party. Source: “A New Dawn for Sovereign Europe,” Patriots.eu, February 10, 2025, https://patriots.eu/a-new-dawn-for-sovereign-europe/.
The International Academy of Catholic Leaders: El Yunque, Catholic Higher Education, and the Vatican
El Yunque’s transnational reach becomes apparent, too, in its presence within the International Academy of Catholic Leaders (IACL). The Academy was founded in Chile in 2006 by Jorge Arturo Medina Estévez (1926–2021), a Chilean bishop of Valparaíso, later cardinal prefect of the Congregation for Divine Worship, together with his disciple José Antonio Rosas Amor, a Mexican political scientist and former member of El Yunque. The IACL presents itself as a leadership-formation initiative: a private, nonprofit foundation preparing lay Catholics for leading roles in public, political, economic, and cultural life.65 Behind this formulation lies a functioning transnational apparatus. By 2024, the Academy operated across 40 dioceses in 14 countries of the Americas and Europe, convening Catholic universities, dioceses, bishops, cardinals, academics, politicians, and other public figures. Its International Board of Trustees is composed of lay and ecclesiastical figures, some of whose former and current members have held, or continue to hold, positions inside the Roman Curia.66
IACL’s leadership became the subject of public controversy in March 2025. On March 17, while Pope Francis lay gravely ill in Rome, the Mexican journalist Álvaro Delgado Gómez—director of investigation at SinEmbargo and author of El Yunque: La ultraderecha en el poder (2003), the foundational investigation of the organization—published a report alleging that El Yunque was working to capture the leadership of key organizations governing Catholic higher education: above all, the Organization of Catholic Universities of Latin America and the Caribbean (ODUCAL) and the International Federation of Catholic Universities (IFCU).67 Ten days later, Rosas Amor (the IACL’s co-founder and executive director) resigned, acknowledging his own former membership in El Yunque and stating that, from July 2024 onward, he had become aware of contacts between the organization’s leadership and a fellow board member, Rodrigo Guerra López.68 Two members of the International Board of Directors, the Colombian theologian Sister Liliana Franco Echeverri and the Bolivian economist Luis Enrique García Rodríguez, resigned days later in solidarity, after the Academy’s leadership moved to sanction Rosas Amor rather than investigate his allegations; García Rodríguez has since returned to the board.69 The crisis would reach its institutional endpoint only after Francis’ death, during the sede vacante that preceded the conclave electing Leo XIV.
The Academy’s governing board went the other way. On March 29, it declared that it had found no evidence that Guerra was currently a member of El Yunque, or that any such affiliation had been used as a strategy of ecclesiastical influence, and vouched for his good faith—citing, among other things, his own account of having suffered physical and psychological abuse within the organization.70 Guerra, for his part, wrote to SinEmbargo acknowledging that he had belonged, intermittently, to El Yunque from 1983 to 1995 and confirming that he had attended a September 2024 meeting at the Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla (UPAEP) alongside Bernardo Ardavín Migoni, an emeritus El Yunque leader, while denying any role in planning a takeover of Catholic universities.71
The Plan and Its Failure
According to Delgado Gómez’s reporting, El Yunque—presided over by Gerardo Aranda Orozco, a former politician of the Mexican right-wing National Action Party (PAN)—held meetings in 2024 with Guerra López and with the Italian former politician Rocco Buttiglione, then president of the IACL’s governing board and a prominent figure of the European Catholic right.72 The meetings allegedly aimed to expand El Yunque’s influence within Catholic higher education. Central to the strategy was a proposal to install Emilio Baños Ardavín, rector of UPAEP—a university with close historical and ideological links to El Yunque—as President of ODUCAL. Buttiglione, Guerra López, and Aranda Orozco reportedly also agreed to promote Fernando Sánchez Campos, rector of the Catholic University of Costa Rica and already the IFCU’s vice president for Latin America, for the Federation’s presidency.73 The stakes were considerable. ODUCAL alone comprises some 115 member universities representing roughly 1.5 million students and more than 110,000 academic staff, and is the largest single organization within the International Federation of Catholic Universities, which federates more than 226 Catholic universities and higher-education institutions worldwide.74 Control of both bodies would have delivered leverage over the sector’s regional and global governance all at once.
The plan did not succeed as described. At ODUCAL’s general assembly in June 2025, Baños Ardavín stood as a candidate for the 2025–2028 presidency and lost; the office went to Father Anderson Antônio Pedroso, rector of the Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro.75 What the exposure did accomplish was the dismantling of the Academy’s leadership. Buttiglione, who had chaired the International Board of Directors since July 2023, tendered his resignation on April 29, 2025, though he remains a member of the reconstituted board.76 Three cardinals departed in the same period: Carlos Aguiar Retes, Archbishop of Mexico since 2018; the Brazilian Odilo Scherer; and the Spaniard Carlos Osoro, who has since rejoined the board. The board asked Guerra López to resign as well. He initially refused, but no longer appears among its members.77
Buttiglione’s own ties to the network are familial rather than organizational. In an April 2025 letter to Colombian Cardinal Luis José Rueda Aparicio, he confirmed what reporting had already surfaced: one of his children is married to a child of Francisco Javier Salazar Sáenz, Mexico’s minister of labor from 2005 to 2006 and, according to Mexican reporting, a senior El Yunque figure known within the organization by the alias “Casablanca.” In the same letter, he denied any participation in secret dealings over the ODUCAL election.78
The reconstituted leadership retained, rather than expelled, the figures at the center of the dispute, at least initially. Mario J. Paredes, a Chilean-American businessman and Catholic lay leader who had advised US President Ronald Reagan on Latin American policy, became president of the governing board; Lara Bersano Calot, an Argentinean communications strategist with professional experience at the Inter-American Development Bank and the Organization of American States, became executive director in place of Rosas Amor.79 The new International Board seated alongside them Cardinals Christophe Pierre and Diego Rafael Padrón Sánchez—the latter a former president of the Venezuelan Episcopal Conference—together with Buttiglione, the Italian politician Paola Binetti, and former Costa Rican President Miguel Ángel Rodríguez.80 Paredes brought his own history: he has financially supported UPAEP and organized a 2013 New York fundraiser soliciting $1,000 contributions for Michelle Bachelet’s presidential campaign, an episode Chilean reporting has characterized in terms of undisclosed foreign financing.81 In August 2025, four months after the crisis, UPAEP awarded Buttiglione an honorary doctorate.82
El Yunque within the Curia
Two men at the center of the controversy hold positions within the Holy See itself. Guerra López’s trajectory is the more consequential. His background runs through the institutions the controversy implicates: a philosophy degree from UPAEP, postgraduate study in university humanism at the Universidad Iberoamericana, and a doctorate in philosophy from the International Academy of Philosophy in Liechtenstein, after which he founded Mexico’s Centro de Investigación Social Avanzada (CISAV).83 He served on the Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace from 2012 to 2016, was named an ordinary member of the Pontifical Academy for Life, and later joined the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences; he also served as vice president of the International Federation of Institutions for Personalistic Bioethics until 2020. On July 26, 2021, Pope Francis appointed him secretary of the Pontifical Commission for Latin America—making him, at that moment, the only layperson holding secretary rank anywhere in the Roman Curia.84 From 2023 onward, the Commission’s president was Cardinal Robert Prevost, who as Pope Leo XIV would become, in May 2025, the pontiff under whom Guerra continues to serve.
Buttiglione is an ordinary member of both the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences and the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, to which he was appointed in May 2015.85 His political career is longer than either appointment. Elected to the Italian Chamber of Deputies in 1994, he served from 2001 to 2005 as Minister for European Union Policies in Silvio Berlusconi’s government.86 In 2004, European Commission President-Elect José Manuel Barroso nominated him as EU Commissioner for Justice, Freedom, and Security; the nomination collapsed amid opposition in the European Parliament to his traditionalist statements on homosexuality and the role of women.87
That rejection produced its own institution. The Dignitatis Humanae Institute (DHI), founded in Rome in 2008 with Buttiglione as a founding patron, became a meeting point for ultra-Catholic, right-wing political and ideological networks.88 Steve Bannon—political strategist, former adviser to US President Donald Trump, and a leading activist of the Catholic right—subsequently became closely involved, promoting a project to establish a training academy for right-wing political activists at Italy’s Abbey of Trisulti.89 The Institute’s patrons have included Prince Charles of Bourbon-Two Sicilies, Duke of Castro—whose daughter, Princess Maria Carolina, has attracted attention through her relationship with Jordan Bardella, president of Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National—and, until his death in 2011, Otto von Habsburg, last crown prince of Austria-Hungary.90

Organizational chart of the Dignitatis Humanae Institute from July 2016. Image in the author’s private collection. Formerly available at: http://www.dignitatishumanae.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Keypeople-H.jpg.
Reporting during the El Yunque-IACL controversy also placed Guerra López at the center of contacts with alleged El Yunque figures in Rome, describing him as continuing to receive financial support from the Mexican episcopate and residing in comfortable circumstances near the international headquarters of the Legionaries of Christ (LC).91 Born from the same Mexican counterrevolutionary turf following the Cristero War, the LC remain influential both economically and within the governing structures of the Holy See, and their relationship with international Catholic organizations such as the IACL situates them indirectly within networks connected to El Yunque.92 Founded in Mexico City on January 3, 1941, by the priest Marcial Maciel, the order was built on its founder’s family connections to the Vatican and to the Cristero movement: his great-uncle Rafael Guízar y Valencia, Bishop of Veracruz, was later canonized, and his relative Jesús Degollado Guízar had served as a general of the Cristero forces.93 These connections, combined with the patronage of Mexico’s wealthy Catholic elites and the benevolence of successive popes, positioned the Legionaries as a disciplined adversary of secularism through the Cold War—a standing that survived Maciel’s exposure as a serial abuser of minors, the congregation’s own 1941–2019 report acknowledging 175 victims abused by 33 of its priests, at least 60 of them by Maciel himself, and the Vatican-mandated reform that produced new constitutions approved in 2014.94
Like El Yunque, the LC have built their influence through education. Their footprint spans the Semper Altius network of schools, the Mano Amiga schools serving lower-income students across Latin America, and a cluster of universities including Mexico’s Anáhuac system, Spain’s Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, and Rome’s Università Europea—an infrastructure of education and prestige reaching from elementary classrooms to pontifical faculty.95
The significance of the IACL controversy lies less in what was attempted than in what it revealed. What it documents most clearly is not the existence of a coordinated plan, which remains contested, but the behavior of the institutions confronted with the allegation. The accuser was sanctioned, dissenting board members departed, and the reconstituted board kept Buttiglione and, for a time, Guerra López. An institution devoted to the formation of Catholic leaders thus offered an unintended lesson in how such leadership conducts itself when questioned.
Conclusion
As demonstrated throughout this report, the El Yunque sect has a long track record of political activities, a significant presence in countries within its sphere of influence, and penetration across multiple social and political arenas. Its ability to translate an ultra-Catholic and reactionary ideology into political platforms that are publicly palatable makes this organization a particularly potent actor within the international far right. El Yunque’s capacity to operate within youth environments and recruit members from an early age also enables it to renew its ranks with relative ease. The sect’s familial dimension further facilitates the transmission of Yunque principles, as the children of senior members are socialized into the movement and recruitment is actively promoted within trusted social circles. Both its national-level front organizations and those operating at a supranational level form part of a broad network of like-minded actors, in which these structures at times play a leading role. Further investigation should examine the presence of El Yunque behind emerging actors of the Hispanic far right, such as the presidency of José Antonio Kast in Chile; the newly-formed Spanish party Se Acabó la Fiesta (SALF);96 the parent organization of HazteOír, the Phoenix Institute; as well as the internal functioning of its recruitment methods.
- Jean A. Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion: The Mexican People between Church and State, 1926–1929 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 178; Jean A. Meyer, Pro domo mea: “La Cristiada” a la distancia, Documentos de Trabajo del CIDE, División de Historia 29 (Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, 2004), 6, 59 ff., https://cide.repositorioinstitucional.mx/jspui/bitstream/1011/166/1/000055649_documento.pdf; “Images of the Cristero War (1926–29),” Memórica, accessed October 15, 2026, https://memoricamexico.gob.mx/es/memorica/La_Guerra_Cristera_ENG. ↩︎
- Mónica Uribe, “La ultraderecha en México: El conservadurismo moderno,” El Cotidiano, no. 149 (2008): 48, 51, https://biblat.unam.mx/hevila/ElCotidiano/2008/no149/4.pdf. ↩︎
- Begoña P. Ramírez, “HazteOír, los ultracatólicos con cuentas opacas y pareja habitual de Manos Limpias en los tribunales,” Público, July 15, 2025, https://www.publico.es/politica/hazteoir-ultracatolicos-cuentas-opacas-pareja-habitual-manos-limpias-tribunales.html; Luis Casal, “Propaganda, fe y millones: así opera CitizenGo, el lobby ultracatólico de HazteOir afín a Putin que está tras la lona contra Sánchez,” El Español, May 25, 2025, https://www.elespanol.com/reportajes/20250525/propaganda-fe-millones-opera-citizengo-lobby-ultracatolico-hazteoir-afin-putin-lona-sanchez/1003743770056_0.html. ↩︎
- Roger Palós, “The Influence of El Yunque, Opus Dei, and Anti-Francisco Robert Sarah on Vox,” Ara, May 2, 2025, https://en.ara.cat/politics/the-influence-of-yunque-opus-dei-and-anti-francisco-robert-sarah-vox_1_5366037.html; Casal, “Propaganda, fe y millones.” ↩︎
- Jasper Jackson et al., “Unholy Alliance: The Far-Right Religious Network Attacking Reproductive and LGBTQ+ Rights,” Bureau of Investigative Journalism, September 25, 2022, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2022-09-25/unholy-alliance-the-far-right-religious-network-attacking-reproductive-and-lgbtq-rights. ↩︎
- Íñigo Domínguez, “El Vaticano encubrió los abusos de Maciel, líder de los Legionarios de Cristo, durante 50 años,” El País, July 22, 2024, https://elpais.com/sociedad/2024-07-22/el-vaticano-conocio-y-encubrio-los-abusos-de-maciel-lider-de-los-legionarios-de-cristo-durante-50-anos.html; “Comunicato della Sala Stampa della Santa Sede,” Sala Stampa della Santa Sede, May 19, 2006, https://press.vatican.va/content/salastampa/it/bollettino/pubblico/2006/05/19/0256/00749.html; “Comunicato della Santa Sede sulla visita apostolica alla Congregazione dei Legionari di Cristo,” Sala Stampa della Santa Sede, May 1, 2010, https://www.vatican.va/resources/resources_comunicato-legionari-cristo-2010_it.html. ↩︎
- José Antonio Rosas Amor, “La Academia de Líderes Católicos no es El Yunque: Ni ayer ni hoy ni nunca,” Vida Nueva Digital, March 21, 2025, https://www.vidanuevadigital.com/tribuna/la-academia-de-lideres-catolicos-no-es-el-yunque-ni-ayer-ni-hoy-ni-nunca-jose-antonio-rosas/; José Antonio Rosas Amor, “El fundador y director general de la Academia de Líderes Católicos renuncia a su cargo,” Religión Digital, March 28, 2025, https://www.religiondigital.org/mundo/fundador-director-Academia-Lideres-Catolicos-despedida_0_2765123483.html. ↩︎
- Irene Ortiz, “Building the City of God: Mexico’s Ultra-Right Yunque,” NACLA Report on the Americas 41, no. 1 (2008): 26–29. ↩︎
- Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Mexico: A fascist group called TECOS (Educational and Cultural Work towards Order and Synthesis); membership and recruitment methods; its relationship to FEMACO (Mexican Federation of Anti-Communist Students) and to the FEJ (Jalisco Students Federation); the latter’s affiliation to the newspaper Ocho Columnas [Ochocolumnas]; ill-treatment of TECOS members who have refused to resort to violence against opposition; and status of the organization (1970-1999),” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, July 1, 1999, https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230522003953/https:/www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aaab20.html; see also Scott Anderson, Inside the League: The Shocking Exposé of How Terrorists, Nazis, and Latin American Death Squads Have Infiltrated the World Anti-Communist League (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986). ↩︎
- Jeremy Fleming-Jones, “Spain’s Vox Leader to Head Patriots for Europe Party,” Euronews, November 16, 2024, https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/11/16/spains-vox-leader-to-head-patriots-for-europe-party. ↩︎
- An encomienda in colonial New Spain (modern-day Mexico and Central America) was a grant made by the Spanish Crown to a colonist (the encomendero) that gave him the right to receive tribute and labor from a specific Indigenous community. ↩︎
- Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion, 105–6, 126. ↩︎
- Leandro Fernandez, “Marcial Maciel and the Legionaries of Christ: A Case Study in Catholic Counterrevolutionary Influence in Modern Mexico and the Global Church,” Transnational History of the Far Right Series, IERES Occasional Papers, no. 39, November 2026, https://www.historyofthefarright.org/marcial-maciel-and-the-legionaries-of-christ-a-case-study-in-catholic-counterrevolutionary-influence-in-modern-mexico-and-the-global-church. ↩︎
- Luis Ángel Hurtado Razo, “Las caras de El Yunque u Orquesta…,” Historia y Grafía, no. 44 (2015): 189–216; Mario Virgilio Santiago Jiménez, “Estudiantes contra la educación socialista: El origen de los Tecos de la Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara, 1932–1935,” in Movimientos estudiantiles en México, siglo XX, ed. Renate Marsiske (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Instituto de Investigaciones sobre la Universidad y la Educación, 2023), 110. ↩︎
- Integralism is a political and social doctrine that holds that religion—most often Catholicism—should provide the organizing principles of public life, including of the state. It rejects the modern separation between church and state and argues that political authority should be “integrated” within a religious moral order. ↩︎
- Meyer, The Cristero Rebellion. ↩︎
- Mónica Naymich López Macedonio, “Historia de una colaboración anticomunista transnacional: Los Tecos de la Universidad Autónoma de Guadalajara y el gobierno de Chiang Kai-Shek a principios de los años setenta,” Contemporánea 1, no. 1 (2010): 133–58. ↩︎
- López Macedonio, “Historia de una colaboración anticomunista transnacional.” ↩︎
- Mario Virgilio Santiago Jiménez, “Julio Meinvielle, Tacuaras, los Tecos y El Yunque contra la ‘infiltración roja’ en México y Argentina,” Cahiers des Amériques latines, no. 79 (2015): 55–74. ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado, El ejército de Dios: Nuevas revelaciones sobre la extrema derecha en México (Mexico City: Plaza & Janés, 2004). ↩︎
- Hurtado Razo, “Las caras de El Yunque u Orquesta, un acercamiento al actuar de una sociedad reservada-secreta.” ↩︎
- Edgar González Ruiz, “El Yunque: Un libro sobre Ramón Plata,” Contralínea, September 29, 2013, https://contralinea.com.mx/opinion/el-yunque-libro-sobre-ramon-plata/. ↩︎
- Hurtado Razo, “Las caras de El Yunque u Orquesta, un acercamiento al actuar de una sociedad reservada-secreta.” ↩︎
- Bernardo Barranco V., “El Yunque conspira contra las universidades,” La Jornada, April 9, 2025, https://www.jornada.com.mx/noticia/2025/04/09/opinion/el-yunque-conspira-contra-las-universidades. ↩︎
- Delgado, El ejército de Dios. ↩︎
- José L. Lobo, “La familia Ruiz Mateos financió a la secta secreta El Yunque tras su desembarco en España,” El Confidencial, March 13, 2012, https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2012-03-13/la-familia-ruiz-mateos-financio-a-la-secta-secreta-el-yunque-tras-su-desembarco-en-espana_232615/. ↩︎
- Delgado, El ejército de Dios. ↩︎
- D.A., “El capellán que testificó contra Rita Maestre, dirigente de la secta paramilitar El Yunque,” El Plural, February 4, 2017, https://www.elplural.com/politica/espana/el-capellan-que-testifico-contra-rita-maestre-dirigente-de-la-secta-paramilitar-el-yunque_99335102. ↩︎
- Carlism is a traditionalist, Catholic, and monarchist movement in Spain that emerged in the 19th century in support of the rival claim of Prince Carlos María Isidro, leading to the Carlist Wars. It developed into a broader counterrevolutionary ideology defending religious authority, regional privileges (fueros), and a hierarchical social order against liberalism. Today, it survives mainly as a small, fragmented political and cultural current with limited influence. ↩︎
- Hermanos Hernando de Larramendi Martínez and P. Rafael Hernando de Larramendi Samaniego, Por qué somos como somos: Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi, desde la cercanía familiar y la lejanía del tiempo (Madrid: Schedas, 2020). ↩︎
- “Ignacio Hernando de Larramendi y Montiano 1921–2001,” Filosofia.org, https://www.filosofia.org/ave/001/a151.htm. ↩︎
- Laura Graciela Rodríguez, “La ‘subversión científica’ en las universidades de Argentina e Hispanoamérica,” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos, 2016, http://nuevomundo.revues.org/68862. ↩︎
- Michael Collins, “Ignacio Arsuaga sobre Yunque: ‘No tengo constancia de que exista,’” InfoVaticana, June 3, 2014, https://infovaticana.com/2014/06/03/ignacio-arsuaga-sobre-yunque-tengo-constancia-de-que-exista/. ↩︎
- Santiago Mata, El Yunque en España (Amanecer, 2017), Kindle edition. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- “Intolerance Network,” WikiLeaks, https://wikileaks.org/intolerancenetwork/get/5. ↩︎
- Danilo Albin, “El entramado de la secta El Yunque en México hace campaña por Vox,” Público, August 11, 2021, https://www.publico.es/politica/entramado-secta-yunque-mexico-campana-vox.html. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- The Phoenix Institute organizes seminars at the University of Trumau (Vienna), as well as online. These seminars generally feature the participation of professors from Spanish and Mexican Catholic universities, such as Salvador Antuñano of the Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, and Diego I. Rosales of the Hápax Action Sciences Institute. Further investigation should be conducted on this Institute. ↩︎
- Jesús Bastante, “El Yunque, Hazte Oír y Abogados Cristianos: El Congreso acoge un acto ultracatólico promocionado con la cruz de Cuelgamuros,” elDiario.es, October 8, 2025, https://www.eldiario.es/sociedad/yunque-hazte-oir-abogados-cristianos-congreso-acoge-acto-ultracatolico-promocionado-cruz-cuelgamuros_1_12666125.html. ↩︎
- Lucía Franco, “Los antiabortistas abren cinco locales alrededor de la Clínica Dator para multiplicar su acoso a mujeres embarazadas,” El País, October 22, 2024, https://elpais.com/espana/madrid/2024-10-22/los-antiabortistas-abren-cinco-locales-alrededor-de-la-clinica-dator-para-multiplicar-su-acoso-a-mujeres-embarazadas.html. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- Mata, El Yunque en España. ↩︎
- Fernando López Luengos, El Transparente de la catedral de Toledo: Análisis del asociacionismo de los laicos cristianos españoles y la intromisión del Yunque (March–April 2010), PDF published by InfoVaticana, https://infovaticana.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Informe-yunque.pdf. ↩︎
- López Luengos, El Transparente, 2. ↩︎
- José L. Lobo, “Testigos revelan en un juicio la identidad de los miembros de la secta secreta El Yunque,” El Confidencial, May 31, 2014, https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2014-05-31/testigos-revelan-en-un-juicio-la-identidad-de-los-miembros-de-la-secta-secreta-el-yunque_138970/. ↩︎
- “Álvaro Zulueta,” LinkedIn, accessed January 14, 2026, https://www.linkedin.com/in/azulueta/. ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado, El Yunque: La ultraderecha en el poder (Mexico City: Plaza & Janés, 2003). ↩︎
- José L. Lobo, “La asistente personal y una empleada de Urdangarín están vinculadas a El Yunque,” El Confidencial, February 13, 2012, https://www.elconfidencial.com/espana/2012-02-13/la-asistente-personal-y-una-empleada-de-urdangarin-estan-vinculadas-a-el-yunque_237725/. ↩︎
- José María Garrido, “La Justicia da por ‘acreditada’ la relación de miembros de Hazte Oír con la sociedad secreta y paramilitar El Yunque,” El Plural, May 28, 2014, https://www.elplural.com/sociedad/religion/la-justicia-da-por-acreditada-la-relacion-de-miembros-de-hazte-oir-con-la-sociedad-secreta-y-paramilitar-el-yunque_40776102. ↩︎
- Monica Cornejo, “De la chaire à la rue: Les positions religieuses ultra-conservatrices contre le genre en Espagne,” in Campagnes anti-genre en Europe, ed. Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte (Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon, 2018), 121–42. ↩︎
- After the founding of Vox, it went on to honor several of its leaders, including Secretary General Javier Ortega Smith, MEP Hermann Tertsch, Madrid Regional Deputy Alicia Rubio, and former judge Francisco Serrano. See Miguel González, Vox S.A.: El negocio del patriotismo español (Barcelona: Península, 2022). ↩︎
- “Nuestro próximo premiado es el presidente de Denaes, Santi Abascal. A él le encanta recordar esa solemne frase de Apuleyo: uno a uno, todos somos inmortales, pero juntos, somos eternos. La unidad de España es la bandera de Santi. Su objetivo: que no sea necesario defenderla. Aunque mucho me temo, Santi, que te va a tocar lidiar unos cuantos años más. Las fuerzas centrípedas [sic] amenazan con destruir a la primera nación del mundo, la descubridora y evangelizadora de América, la descubridora del Derecho Internacional, la cuna, principalmente, del
derecho y de la democracia.” See Santiago Mata, Vox y el Yunque: La sociedad secreta que hizo grande a Santiago Abascal (Amanecer, 2020), Kindle edition. ↩︎ - González, Vox S.A. ↩︎
- Pau Hernández, “La larga transición de la Nueva Derecha española: Una historia silente, 1975–2004,” PhD diss., Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2024. ↩︎
- González, Vox S.A. ↩︎
- Mata, Vox y el Yunque; Palós, “Influence of El Yunque”; see also Euskal Irrati Telebista, “¿Qué relación hay entre Vox, Hazte Oir y El Yunque?” 360 grados, EITB, December 2, 2018, https://www.eitb.eus/es/television/programas/360-grados/vox-santiago-abascal/videos/detalle/6033209/video-hay-relacion-entre-vox-hazte-oir-y-grupo-de-extrema-derecha-el-yunque/. ↩︎
- Mata, Vox y el Yunque. ↩︎
- Adam Ramsay and Claire Provost, “Revealed: The Trump-Linked ‘Super PAC’ Working behind the Scenes to Drive Europe’s Voters to the Far Right,” openDemocracy, April 25, 2019, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/revealed-the-trump-linked-super-pac-working-behind-the-scenes-to-drive-europes-voters-to-the-far-right/. ↩︎
- Mata, Vox y el Yunque. ↩︎
- And contributor to key far-right outlets such as The European Conservative. See Francisco José Contreras, “VOX and the Strange Death of Europe,” The European Conservative, 2022, https://europeanconservative.com/articles/commentary/vox-and-the-strange-death-of-europe/. ↩︎
- Mata, Vox y el Yunque. ↩︎
- “Who We Are,” International Academy of Catholic Leaders, accessed September 16, 2026, https://liderescatolicos.net/en/who-we-are/. ↩︎
- “La expansión de la Academia de Líderes Católicos,” Cuaderno de Bitácora, September 2024, https://www.vmarbeloa.es/la-expansion-de-la-academia-de-lideres-catolicos/. ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado Gómez, “El Papa enfermo, la ultraderecha acelera: El Yunque plantea controlar universidades,” SinEmbargo, March 17, 2025, https://www.sinembargo.mx/4629196/el-papa-enfermo-la-ultraderecha-acelera-el-yunque-plantea-controlar-universidades/. On Delgado Gómez’s standing as the principal investigator of El Yunque, see Delgado, El Yunque. ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado Gómez, “Directivos de escuelas católicas renuncian tras oponerse a plan de extrema derecha,” SinEmbargo, March 27, 2025, https://www.sinembargo.mx/4633642/directivos-de-escuelas-catolicas-renuncian-tras-oponerse-a-plan-de-extrema-derecha/; José Beltrán, “José Antonio Rosas renuncia como director de la Academia de Líderes Católicos,” Vida Nueva Digital, March 29, 2025, https://www.vidanuevadigital.com/2025/03/29/jose-antonio-rosas-renuncia-como-director-de-la-academia-de-lideres-catolicos/. ↩︎
- Delgado Gómez, “Directivos de escuelas católicas renuncian tras oponerse a plan de extrema derecha”; International Academy of Catholic Leaders, “Who We Are.” ↩︎
- Beltrán, “José Antonio Rosas renuncia como director de la Academia de Líderes Católicos.” ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado Gómez, “Mexicano se deslinda de conjura del Yunque y acusa a la organización de ser violenta,” SinEmbargo, April 11, 2025, https://www.sinembargo.mx/4639476/mexicano-se-deslinda-de-conjura-del-yunque-y-acusa-a-la-organizacion-de-ser-violenta/. ↩︎
- Delgado Gómez, “El Papa enfermo, la ultraderecha acelera.” ↩︎
- Delgado Gómez, “El Papa enfermo, la ultraderecha acelera”; “Presentation,” International Federation of Catholic Universities, archived on February 26, 2024, https://web.archive.org/web/20240226165518/https://www.fiuc.org/rubrique6_en.html. ↩︎
- Pope Francis, “Discurso del Santo Padre Francisco a los participantes en el Congreso de la Organización de Universidades Católicas de América Latina y el Caribe (ODUCAL),” Vatican.va, May 4, 2023, https://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/es/speeches/2023/may/documents/20230504-universidades-catolicas.html; International Federation of Catholic Universities, “Presentation.” ↩︎
- Ángel Morillo, “Anderson Antonio Pedroso es el nuevo presidente de la Organización de Universidades Católicas de América Latina y el Caribe,” ADN Celam, June 5, 2025, https://adn.celam.org/anderson-antonio-pedroso-es-el-nuevo-presidente-de-la-organizacion-de-universidades-catolicas-de-america-latina-y-el-caribe/. ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado Gómez, “Presidente y obispo mexicano dejan Academia Católica por conjura de la ultraderecha,” SinEmbargo, April 30, 2025, https://www.sinembargo.mx/4646325/presidente-y-obispo-mexicano-dejan-academia-catolica-por-conjura-de-la-ultraderecha/; “Nuevo capítulo en la crisis de la Academia de Líderes Católicos: Rocco Buttiglione renuncia,” InfoVaticana, April 30, 2025, https://infovaticana.com/2025/04/30/nuevo-capitulo-en-la-crisis-de-la-academia-de-lideres-catolicos-rocco-buttiglione-renuncia/; International Academy of Catholic Leaders, “Who We Are.” ↩︎
- “Nuevo capítulo en la crisis de la Academia de Líderes Católicos: Rocco Buttiglione renuncia”; Lara Bersano Calot, “Formar líderes católicos es urgente,” Religión Digital, July 5, 2025, https://www.religiondigital.org/opinion/Formar-lideres-catolicos-necesita-esperanza-academia_0_2793920582.html; International Academy of Catholic Leaders, “Who We Are.” ↩︎
- Rocco Buttiglione, letter to Cardinal Luis José Rueda Aparicio, April 2025, reproduced in Álvaro Delgado’s reporting, https://www.sinembargo.mx/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Carta_Cardenal_Rueda_Abril_2025.pdf; Delgado Gómez, “Presidente y obispo mexicano dejan Academia Católica por conjura de la ultraderecha.” ↩︎
- Delgado Gómez, “Presidente y obispo mexicano dejan Academia Católica por conjura de la ultraderecha”; Bersano Calot, “Formar líderes católicos es urgente.” ↩︎
- Bersano Calot, “Formar líderes católicos es urgente.” ↩︎
- Ivonne Toro Agurto and Pablo Basadre, “Así operó la recaudación de fondos en el extranjero para la campaña de Bachelet,” The Clinic, January 15, 2015, https://www.theclinic.cl/2015/01/15/asi-opero-la-recaudacion-de-fondos-en-el-extranjero-para-la-campana-de-bachelet/; Delgado Gómez, “Presidente y obispo mexicano dejan Academia Católica por conjura de la ultraderecha.” ↩︎
- Fernanda Bretón, “UPAEP distingue a Rocco Buttiglione con Doctorado Honoris Causa,” UPAEP, August 18, 2025, https://upress.mx/secciones/campus-y-comunidad/15016-upaep-distingue-a-rocco-buttiglione-con-doctorado-honoris-causa. ↩︎
- Enrique Zamudio, “Nombra el Papa Francisco a Rodrigo Guerra como secretario de la Comisión Pontificia para América Latina,” Noticias de Querétaro, July 27, 2021, https://noticiasdequeretaro.com.mx/2021/07/27/nombra-el-papa-francisco-a-rodrigo-guerra-como-secretario-de-la-comision-pontificia-para-america-latina/. ↩︎
- “Nombramientos pontificios para la Comisión Pontificia para América Latina,” Vatican News, July 26, 2021, https://www.vaticannews.va/es/papa/news/2021-07/nombramientos-pontificios-comision-america-latina.html. ↩︎
- “Rocco Buttiglione,” Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, accessed September 18, 2026, http://www.pass.va/content/scienzesociali/en/academicians/ordinary/buttiglione.html; “Rocco Buttiglione,” Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas, accessed September 18, 2026, https://www.past.va/en/academicians/ordinary/rocco-buttiglione.html. ↩︎
- “Rocco Buttiglione,” Camera dei Deputati, Portale storico, accessed September 18, 2026, https://storia.camera.it/deputato/rocco-buttiglione-19480606. ↩︎
- “Hearing of Rocco Buttiglione,” European Parliament, October 5, 2004, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/press/audicom2004/resume/041005_BUTTIGLIONE_EN.pdf. ↩︎
- Dignitatis Humanae Institute, accessed September 18, 2026, https://dignitatishumanae.org/. ↩︎
- Mark Hosenball, “Steve Bannon Drafting Curriculum for Right-Wing Catholic Institute in Italy,” Euronews, September 14, 2018, https://www.euronews.com/2018/09/14/steve-bannon-drafting-curriculum-for-right-wing-catholic-institute-in-italy. ↩︎
- Hosenball, “Steve Bannon Drafting Curriculum.” ↩︎
- Álvaro Delgado Gómez, “El plan yunquista de dominar universidades católicas mete en pugna a cúpula religiosa,” SinEmbargo, March 29, 2025, https://www.sinembargo.mx/4634335/el-plan-yunquista-de-dominar-universidades-catolicas-mete-en-pugna-a-cupula-religiosa/. ↩︎
- “Legionarios de Cristo: Cuáles son los negocios y colegios de élite de la acaudalada congregación,” Infobae, January 23, 2020, https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2020/01/23/legionarios-de-cristo-cuales-son-los-negocios-y-colegios-de-elite-de-la-acaudalada-congregacion/. ↩︎
- Daniel Cecchini, “Marcial Maciel y sus Legionarios de Cristo: La historia del ‘mayor depredador sexual de la iglesia,’” Infobae, January 2, 2022, https://www.infobae.com/historias/2022/01/03/marcial-maciel-y-sus-legionarios-de-cristo-la-historia-del-mayor-depredador-sexual-de-la-iglesia/. ↩︎
- Cecchini, “Marcial Maciel y sus Legionarios de Cristo”; “Informe 1941–2019,” Cero Abusos, accessed September 18, 2026, https://www.0abusos.org/informe-1941-2019-2/; “La Santa Sede aprueba las Constituciones de los Legionarios de Cristo,” ZENIT, November 3, 2014, https://es.zenit.org/2014/11/03/la-santa-sede-aprueba-las-constituciones-de-los-legionarios-de-cristo-2/. ↩︎
- “Entérate. Semper Altius, los colegios de los Legionarios de Cristo,” El Universal, June 21, 2017, https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2017/06/21/enterate-semper-altius-los-colegios-de-los-legionarios-de-cristo/; Infobae, “Legionarios de Cristo: Cuáles son los negocios y colegios de élite.” ↩︎
- Although initially dismissed by many observers, conspiracy-minded influencer Alvise Pérez led a list that secured nearly 4% of the vote in Spain during the 2024 European elections. His party, Se Acabó la Fiesta (SALF, or “The Party is Over”), a far-right organization that emerged from a Telegram channel with over 700,000 subscribers, made an unexpected breakthrough on the Spanish political stage, winning 800,763 votes. Political analysts have drawn comparisons between Pérez and figures such as Argentina’s President Javier Milei and El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele. See Steven Forti, “Alvise Pérez: 10 phrases choc du nouveau troisième homme des droites espagnoles,” Le Grand Continent, July 11, 2024, https://legrandcontinent.eu/fr/2024/07/11/alvise-perez-10-phrases-choc-du-nouveau-troisieme-homme-des-droites-espagnoles/. ↩︎





